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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
THE ST J\ TE OF UT AH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No.

vs.

11730

fRFD A. CUNICO,

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This :3.ppeal concerns the legality of evidence
2e1zed pursuant to a warrant and the subsequent
conviction and sentence thereof.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The defendant was tried and found guilty of
Ihe cnme of possession of marijuana.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an order in harmony with
1below.
,(;) . .
.J

2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
William Dermody, a Deputy in the Weber Cou:
ty Sheriff's Office, was telephoned by a nurse wh
informed him that she had just spoken to a M'
White and that White had not only acted an:
talked strangely, but also that he informed her the:
he was on a trip. The nurse informed the officer
that her conclusion was that White was using so!l'.,
type of narcotic. This conclusion was thereafter sue
stantiated when the peace officer was telephoned
a Catholic father who stated that Mr. White
been taking narcotic drugs.
The officer then made an application for c
search warrant and prepared a written affidavi;
stating his reasons and the names of his informers
as to why the warrant should be granted.
This warrant was used by the Weber Countv
Sheriff's Office and marijuana was found. A jury
convicted White and the appellant, who was alsc
living at the place searched.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS PROPERLY ISSUED
AND THE EVIDENCE THEREBY SEIZED WAS PROPERLY ADMITTED.

The search warrant is not only a helpful tool for
law enforcement agencies but also an effectivE
means of controlling crime. As long as constitu-
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tional safeguards are met, search warrants may
:X!Jperly be issued. Point I of this brief thereby conitself with whether or not these constitutional
safeguards have been met in the instant case.
Both the fourth Amendment of the Constitution
of the United States and the Utah State Constitution
make the following statement:
"The right of the people to be secure in
their per<;0ns, houses, papers and effects against
unreason:iblc searches and seizures shall not be
1·iolated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place and the person
or thing to be seized." United States Constitution, Amendment IV; Utah Constitution,
Article I,
14.

Utah statutes specify the required steps one
must take hefore a magistrate can properly issue a
warrant. In order for a peace officer to obtain a search
warro.nt the following outlined requirements must
be met:
A.

The complainant must be examined upon
cath by the magistrate. Utah Code Ann. §
77-54-4 ( 1953).

B.

The complainant must sign a written deposition (Utah Code Ann. § 77-54-4) setting forth
facts or probable cause for believing that
one of the following grounds exist (Utah
Code Ann. § 77-54-5):
l. Presence of stolen property;
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2. Presence of property used in cornmi'
ting a felony; or
3. Presence of property which is intendec
to be used in committing a public oi.
fense. Utah Code Ann. § 77-54-2 (195j)
A. A MAGISTRATE'S DETERMINATION Of
PROBABLE CAUSE IN ISSUING A SEARCH WAR
RANT MUST BE GIVEN GREAT DEFERENCE BY
REVIEWING COURTS.
In the case of Spinelli v. United States, 89 S. Ct. 584
(1969) the defendant was convicted of interstate
travel in aid of racketeering. A search warrant was
issued upon the affiant's conclusion that the anony.
mous informer was reliable. In holding that the
search warrant was improperly issued because ol
lack of information, the United States Supreme
Court made the following significant statement:
"The affidavit, then, falls short of the standards set forth in Aquilar, Draper, and our other
decisions that give content to the notion of probable cause. In holding as we have done, we do
not retreat from the established propositions that
only the probability, and not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard of probable cause . . . that affidavits of probable cause
are tested by much less rigorous standards than
those governing the admissibility of evidence at
trial . . . that in judging probable cause issuing
magistrates are not to be confined by nigardly
limit:ltions or by restrictions on the use of their
common sense ... and that their determination
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of probable cause should be paid great deference
by reviewing courts . . . " Id., 89 S. Ct. at 590591.

B. THIS AFFIDAVIT FOR THE SEARCH WARRANT STA'T'ED SUFFICIENT FACTS TO SHOW
PROBABLE CAUSE.
As stated by Spinelli 1 United States, supra, this
court should give great deference to the common
sense of the issuing magistrate.
1•

From the affidavit as set out in Appellant's Brief,
pages 2 and 3, it is noted that both informers were
named. This fact alone distinguishes the instant case
from Spinelli and Aquilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 84 S. Ct.
1509 (1964), and the standards set up by those cases
dealing with anonymous informers are thereby inapposite.
The appellant contends that the complainant did
not support his claim that he had received credible,
reliable information. This contention has no merit.
The affidavit itself names not only the nurse who
initially called the peace officer, but also the Rev.
Glen M. Schrop, Pastor of St. Helens Catholic
Church in Roosevelt, Utah. Common sense dictates
that when a nurse calls a police officer informing
l im of one who is using narcotics, and the nurse's
telephone call is substantiated later by a Catholic
Father, who also states that this person had been
using narcotics, credibility can hardly be an issue.
1

It would be easy for the magistrate to determine
ihat +here were narcotics being used at 170 Ogden
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Canyon. The nurse (who would have more familk
ity with drugs than either the peace officer or tt.
magistrate) had stated that White told her that f:·
was on a trip, although William White was at horr
when she called. Mrs. Jorgensen also stated th:
White acted differently and that he told her hwanted to die and return to heaven. From thes:
facts, which were all stated in the affidavit, Nurs:
Jorgensen assumed Bill White was on some type
of narcotic drug. From this testimony alone the maq
istrate could have determined that there was pro!!
able cause and could have issued a proper war
rant. But in addition to the nurse's conclusion abou1
narcotic use, Father Schrop had called the peace ol
ficer and told him that White had been taking narcotics. Common sense gave the magistrate no chokE
-he had to issue the warrant. Note the following
statute:
"If the magistrate is thereupon satisfied of
the existence of the grounds of the application,
or that there is probable cause to believe their
existence, he must issue a search warrant, signed
by him with his official title, to a peace officer
in his county, commanding him forthwith to
search the person or place named for the property
specified and to bring it before the magistrate."
Utah Code Ann. § 77- 54-6 ( 19 53) (Emphasis
added.)

C. A SEARCH WARRANT NEED NOT NAME
THE DEFENDANT IN ORDER TO USE THE SEIZED
EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM.
In the instant case, probable cause was found
to exist and a search warrant was properly issued
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The warrant named William White and stated the
address at 170 Ogden Canyon. The police officers
were not misled. They went to the named premises
and found marijuana there. The Utah and United
States Constitutional requirements were not violated. The reason why the person or property must
be particularly described is to insure that the right
premises and right person will be searched and not
innocent neighbors.
A contention similar to appellant's was made in
the case of Mil/Pr v. Siglrr, 353 F.2d 424 (8th Cir. 1965).
In that case the court sets out the following guideline:
"Finally, pet1t10ner objects to not being
personally named in the warrant. This issue, however, does not appear ripe for review. It was not
presented below in the petition and no reference
was made to the point during the hearing.
Therefore, this Court is not in a position to be
.1ble to make a substantive finding on the merits.
It might be well taken by the parties, however,
if the Court were to make one observation. The
warrant appears to describe with particularity
the place to be searched and the things to be
seized. This it-ould seem to satisfy the constitutional requirements in this case, for the Fourth
Amendment docs not require the warrant to name
the person who occupies the described premises."
LI., 3 5 3 F.2d at 428. (Emphasis added.)

This dicta would apply to our fact situation. The
N,:nrant described the place to be searched, and
ncimr::d the tenant. This satisfies the requirements.
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There was probable cause for believing sufficient
grounds. The informers were named, common sense
demands credibility in this case, and the place to be
searched was adequately described. Therefore, the
search warrant was properly issued and the evidence thereby seized was properly admitted.
D. APPELLANT HAS BEEN DENIED NO SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS RIGHTS.
The facts in this case are as follows. A receipt
was made out for a pipe. Officer Dermody later
added two other items to that receipt. The receipt
was originally given to Fred Cunico. According to
the transcript, both White and Cunico were present when the additional items were added. The
policeman testified as follows:
"I asked for the receipt back, I believe from
Mr. Cunico and I added the other two items, and
I am not sure which one I gave it back to."
(R. at 40)

There is testimony by White that he did not receive
the receipt. (R. at 45). Cunico would be the logical
one to have received it. He never did deny receipt.
The question was therefore properly submitted to
the jury.
Once a magistrate receives the return of the
warrant he also should receive a verified affidavit
by the peace officer at the foot of the inventory. Utah
Code Ann. § 77-54-15 (1953). Also note the following
statute:
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"The magistrate must thereupon, if required,
deliver a copy of the inventory to the person from
whose possession the property was taken, and to
the applicant for the warrant." Utah Code Ann.
77-54-16 (1953). (Emphasis added.)

It is not mandatory for the magistrate to give a
copy of the inventory to the property owner. The
court is referred to United States v. Greene, 141 F. Supp.
856 (1956), wherein the court correctly points out
that the weight of authority favors the idea that:
" . . . . . [S]taturoy requirements as to the
receipt and inventory are only ministerial, and
that failure to comply therewith will not invalidate a valid warrant, or render inadmissible the
articles seized." Id., 141 F. Supp. at 858.

Substantial compliance with statutes governing the
execution of search warrants is all that is required.
United States v. Freeman, 144 F. Supp. 669 (1956).
POINT II
THE JURY INSTRUCTION PROPERLY STATED
THE LAW, AND WAS NOT PREJUDICIAL.

The instruction given is quoted in part below:
"You must find that State's exhibit C. (the
pipe) and I or State's exhibit B. is marijuana
prohibited under the Utah statutes from being
in the possession of anyone. . . . To qualify the
material must be leaves or stems. They need not
be ID any particular quantity because the law
to (sic) distinction between the posses-
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sion, though the amount possessed may be of concern to a judge in passing sentence, it would not
be material to the guilt or innocence of the defendant except a person cannot be guilty without
consciousness thereof." (R. at 17, Instruction
No. 6).

The court is given discretion in certain types o!
punishments.
"When discretion is conferred upon the
court as to the extent of punishment, the court,
at the time of pronouncing judgment, may take
into consideration any circumstances, either in
aggravation or mitigation of the punishment,
which may then be presented to it by either
party." Utah Code Ann.§ 77-35-12 (1953).

According to this statute, the trial judge did not
misstate the law.
The contention of the appellant is merely metaphysical. He argues that upon hearing this instruction the jurors would find appellant guilty knowing
that punishment would be slight. The exact opposite
could be as easily argued. The jurors could just as
easily have decided that since the sentence would
be light they would find not guilty and achieve the
sa.me result.
In view of the common knowledge the publlc
has of the sentencing system of our courts, no prejudice could have resulted in this instruction. The
public at large knows of the things that the judge
takes into consideration when he sentences one convicted of a crime. By informing the jury of the stat
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utory Jaw, the judge merely showed the jury his
knowledge of his own duties.
It should be pointed out that the challenged instruction includes a phrase which states that the
amount of marijuana found is immaterial to the guilt
or innocence of the defendant. This statement is
found after the challenged clause.
Courts frequently find that no prejudicial error
results fro".11 comments or instructions by the Judge
informing the jury of the possibility of parole, when
no death penalty was imposed. See Cullens v. State,
94 Ga. App. 894, 96 S.E.2d 540 (1957); McKee v. State,
159 Fla. 794, 33 So. 2d 50 (1947); People 1'. Suk.do!, 322
Ill. 540, 153 N.E. 727 (1926); and Goddart v. State, 65
Okla. Crim. 472, 88 P.2d 911 (1939).
POINT III
WITHOUT A SHOWING THAT THE PRESENTENCE REPORT INJURED THIS APPELLANT,
THE SUPREME COURT SHOULD CONTINUE TO REFUSE REVIEW OF THIS TYPE OF ISSUE.

In Utah it is common practice for the judge to
examine pre-sentence reports in order to pass a fair
sentence on the convicted felon. The preparation of
this report is one of the duties of parole and probation officers.
With statutes very similar to ours, the Idaho Supreme Court has dealt with this problem several
times .The most recent Idaho decision on this point
finally places Idaho in the same judicial position as
Utah has been for many years.
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In State v. Rolfl', 92 Idaho 467, 444 P.2d 428 0968),
the Court was dealing with a person convicted of
rape. A pre-sentence report was presented to the
Court for examination. The Idaho Supreme Court
looked at its previous decisions which seemed to
indicate that the complete pre-sentence report had to
be disclosed to both parties. The Court courageously
made the following statement:
"We now modify these rulings to comport
with what this court deems the better rule, namely, that the trial judge has discretion as to whether
the full contents of the pre-sentence report be
disclosed to the defendant at the hearing on
his application for probation. Where the trial
judge chooses not to disclose the report, he is obligated, however, to give the defendant sufficient
information concerning adverse matters contained therein so that the defendant may be in
a position to offer intelligent refution." Id., 444
P.2d at 433-434.

This decision makes good judicial sense. Persons
may feel free giving information to a probation officer to be included in a pre-sentence report if they
know that their identity will not be revealed. But if
the full report were to be made public, the desired
information would be small indeed.
The appellant does not allege that he asked the
Judge what particular matters were taken into consideration in passing the sentence. He therefore does
not fit into the better rule as laid down by the Idaho
Court.
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Many years ago, Utah passed on this question
and came up with the same answer that Idaho reached last year. In the case of State 1·. Martin, 49 Utah 346,
164 P. 500 (1917), the Supreme Court of Utah was
asked to consider a case where judge's preliminary
remarks indicated that he was influenced in the
sentence he gave by facts and circumstances of
other encounters with that defendant. The court held
that since the fairness of the trial was not questioned,
the issue was not reviewable by the Supreme Court
but should be presented to the board of pardons.
There is nothing in the record to show that Appellant was not adequately given opportunity to
question or object to the sentencing process in this
case. This question then, should not be a reviewable
issue.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons submitted, the Respondent urges
the Honorable Court to affirm the lower court's rulinq.

Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
State of Utah
LA UREN N. BEASLEY
Chief Assistant Attorney General

DAVID S. YOUNG
Assistant Attorney General
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Respondent

